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Closed to the Media: The Defendant's
Right of Privacy in the Preliminary
Examination
By JOSEPH A. WYNNE*
I
Introduction
In 1982 the California Legislature amended section 868 of the
California Penal Code. Now, if one accused of a crime wants to
close his preliminary hearing to the public (and the press), he
must show that an open hearing would endanger his right to a
fair trial.' The San Francisco Chronicle headlined the change
as "A Compromise for Free Press, Fair Trials."2 Indeed, the
newly amended law was a compromise. It was wrought from
six bills introduced over a four month period.' The new law
* Member, Third Year Class. B.A., University of California, Riverside, 1972; M.A.,
Gallaudet College, 1977. The author would like to thank Robert M. Sanger, Esq. for his
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1. Section 868 of the Penal Code is amended to read:
The examination shall be open and public. However, upon the request of
the defendant and a finding by the magistrate that exclusion of the public is
necessary in order to protect the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial,
the magistrate shall exclude from the examination every person except the
clerk, court reporter and bailiff, the prosecutor and his or her counsel, the At-
torney General, the district attorney of the county, the investigating officer,
the officer having custody of a prisoner witness while the prisoner is testifying,
the defendant and his or her counsel, the officer having the defendant in cus-
tody and a person chosen by the prosecuting witness who is not'himself or
herself a witness but who is present to provide the prosecuting witness moral
support, provided that the person so chosen shall not discuss prior to or dur-
ing the preliminary examination the testimony of the prosecuting witness
with any person, other than the prosecuting witness, who is a witness in the
examination. Nothing in this section shall affect the right to exclude witnesses
as provided in Section 867 of the Penal Code.
This section shall become operative on March 1, 1982.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 868, ch. 83, § 3, Stat. 1982 (amended 1982).
2. See San Francisco Chron., Jan. 21, 1982, at 6.
3. The six bills are:
A.B. 149, introduced on December 12, 1980 and withdrawn by its author on
June 8, 1981. This bill was initially intended to repeal section 868. On May 12,
1981 it was amended and sought to amend 868 to the effect that either the de-
fense or the prosecution could move to close a preliminary examination on
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sought to balance the right of the public (and the press) to
courtroom access against the defendant's right to a fair trial;4
more startlingly, it compromised what had been an unarticu-
lated but nevertheless untrammeled right: that of an accused
person to protect his privacy from scrutiny by the public in the
courtroom until probable cause for a public trial had been
established.
This note argues for the defendant's categorical right to close
his preliminary examination on the ground that he has a right
to privacy until probable cause for a public trial has been es-
tablished. Forcing one accused of a felony to defend himself in
a public forum before the government has established that
there is cause to believe he has committed a crime, deprives
him of the right of privacy expressly granted in the California
Constitution.'
To support this argument, the note will first examine gener-
ally, the press's right to cover courtroom proceedings. Sec-
grounds of the reasonable likelihood that either the defendant would be un-
able to obtain a fair trial or that a witness would not be able to testify freely
and completely if the public were not excluded. A.B. 149 would have required
the magistrate to state on the record, his reasons for his ruling. A May 28, 1981
amendment further altered the bill to the effect that a preliminary examina-
tion must be open unless the defendant could demonstrate the existence of a
clear and present danger to his fair trial rights and that alternatives to closure
would not adequately protect that right.
A.B. 157 was introduced on December 16, 1980 and hearings were cancelled
at the sponsor's request on June 8, 1981. The bill's purpose was to repeal sec-
tion 868.
On January 8, 1981, A.B. 245 was introduced. It provided for an open exami-
nation except where the defendant moved for closure and the public had been
heard. On May 19, 1981, the bill was amended so that closure would be permit-
ted only upon the magistrate's finding 'that the exclusion of the public is nec-
essary to protect defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial." Like its
predecessors, the bill was withdrawn from committee by its sponsor on June 8,
1981.
Senate Bill 108, introduced on January 12, 1981 proposed to add a section
(§ 976.5) to the Penal Code: "Notwithstanding section 868, all court proceed-
ings which involved violent or dangerous felonies shall be open to the public."
The bill then listed some thirty-two offenses to be defined as violent or danger-
ous felonies. Action on this bill was postponed by the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee on February 25, 1981. On February 1, 1982, the bill was returned to the
Secretary of State.
'A.B. 277 was introduced on January 19, 1981 and was thrice amended by the
Assembly and once by the Senate.
Senate Bill 348 was introduced on February 24, 1981 to repeal section 868.
The sponsor requested hearings be cancelled on April 1, 1981.
4. See supra note 1.
5. See infra text accompanying note 68.
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ondly, it will discuss the importance of the preliminary
examination as the forum where probable cause for prosecu-
tion is judicially verified. The standard of probable cause as
the requisite for all police and prosecutorial intrusions on the
individual's privacy will be surveyed. Then the distinction be-
tween the government's right to collect information about an
individual's possibly criminal activities and its right to publi-
cize that information will be drawn by looking at cases where
arrest and grand jury records have been sealed or expunged on
privacy grounds even where the information in those records
may have been truthful.
Finally the note will compare the effect of the old law which
allowed a defendant to preserve his privacy from forced, pre-
mature, public scrutiny with the new law which has eliminated
concern for the individual's privacy from having any place in
the decision to close the preliminary examination.
II
Rights of the Press in the Courtroom
It is well established that the press may report events that
transpire in an open courtroom.6 In Nebraska Press Associa-
tion v. Stuart,7 the United States Supreme Court reiterated the
rule that a very strong presumption exists against prior re-
straint on speech and publication. There, the petitioner sought
to overturn a trial judge's order barring published or broadcast
accounts of a murder defendant's confession or admissions, ex-
cept for those made directly by the defendant to members of
the press. In granting the petition, the Supreme Court stopped
short of categorically ruling out prior restraint but found the
presumption against such a restraint a great burden to over-
come.8 California courts have shown at least as much antipa-
thy for prior restraint on the press.'
The U.S. Supreme Court has also held that the press may
publish records which are open to the public. In Cox Broad-
casting Corp. v. Cohn,10 a suit for invasion of privacy was
brought by members of a deceased rape victim's family. The
suit was filed after members of the press published the name
6. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
7. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
8. 427 U.S. at 558.
9. See Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138 (1973).
10. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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and address of the victim even though state law forbade such
publication. The information had been obtained from court
records which had been mistakenly opened to the press. The
Supreme Court held that where the press has legitimate ac-
cess to such information, it may publish it regardless of the pri-
vacy rights asserted by those who are the subject of such court
records."
Nebraska Press and Cox make it clear that once the press
and the public receive sensitive or questionable information
from the open courtroom, there is scant remedy afforded those
who consider themselves injured if such information is publi-
cized. The criminal defendant has no recourse once his reputa-
tion is damaged by information publicized from a preliminary
examination. Neither restraining orders nor damages will be
granted against the press if such information is lawfully ob-
tained and disseminated.
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the Supreme
Court spoke of the "unbroken, uncontradicted history, as valid
today as in centuries past, [which binds the court] to conclude
that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of
the criminal trial under our system of justice."'2 Except where
there is proven danger to fair trial rights, pretrial and trial ses-
sions are open to the press and the public.' The courts may
not impose prior restraints on the press in reporting court pro-
cedures unless they satisfy a very heavy burden of proof. 4
In an action brought by a man whose distant criminal past
had been revealed by a publisher, the California Supreme
Court stated that "truthful reports of recent crimes and the
names of suspects or offenders will be deemed protected by
the First Amendment."' 5 Obviously a defendant in an active
case cannot assert a cause of action against the press for truth-
ful reports of current criminal proceedings.'
Clearly, the press may publish information about the defend-
ant which it has legally obtained. What is not clear is whether
or not the government, at a preliminary examination, may ex-
pose to the public embarrassing information about a defend-
11. 420 U.S. at 494-495.
12. 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980).
13. Id. at 581 n.18.
14. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 570.
15. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 537 (1971) (emphasis
in the opinion).
16. 4 Cal. 3d at 536.
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ant, information that may indicate a defendant has committed
a crime, before probable cause to put the defendant on public
trial has been established.
III
The Preliminary Examination 17
A. Its Purpose
The preliminary examination is universally recognized as a
screening mechanism. 8 Its aim is "to weed out groundless and
unsupported charges of grave offenses and to relieve the ac-
cused of the degradation and expense of a criminal trial."'9
Whatever use the preliminary hearing may be to the defendant
in preparing a defense for his trial,20 whatever ancillary bene-
fits the state may derive from the preliminary hearing,2' its pri-
mary function is to filter out those charges which are not
adequately founded. An adequate foundation requires a show-
ing of sufficient cause to believe the accused has committed a
particular offense. 22
B. "Sufficient Cause"
The term "sufficient cause" means reasonable or probable
cause,23 and it is defined as "such a state of facts as would lead
a man of ordinary caution or prudence to believe, and consci-
entiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the ac-
cused. ' 24 The defendant's guilt or innocence is not the issue at
the preliminary examination,25 and evidence to support an in-
dictment or an information need not be sufficient to support a
conviction.26
17. The California Penal Code uses the term "examination" (See, e.g., CAL. PENAL
CODE § 872) whereas courts use the terms preliminary examination and preliminary
hearing interchangeably. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584 (1978).
18. Y. KAMsAR, W. LA FAvE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 20 (5th ed.
1980).
19. Wilson v. Harris, 351 F.2d 840, 843 (1965), cert. den., 383 U.S. 951 (quoting Jaffe v.
Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146 (1941)).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 30 and 36.
21. For example, testimony of a defense witness at a preliminary examination may
be admissible under an exception to the hearsay rules as a prior inconsistent state-
ment of the present witness. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
22. CAL. PENAL CODE § 872(a) (West 1970).
23. People v. Orduno, 80 Cal. App. 3d 738, 750 (1978), cert. den., 439 U.S. 1074.
24. People v. Nagle, 25 Cal. 2d 216, 222 (1944).
25. Id.
26. Williams v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 1144, 1150 (1969).
No. 21
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C. The Importance of the Hearing
Before a defendant can be bound over for trial in the supe-
rior court, a magistrate2 7 must examine the prosecution's evi-
dence to determine if there is probable cause to believe the
defendant committed the offense charged.28
The importance of the preliminary examination in determin-
ing whether to try a defendant has been recognized by the
United States Supreme Court. In Coleman v. Alabama, the
Court held such an examination to be a "critical stage"29 of the
criminal proceeding. In reversing the defendants' convictions
because they did not have counsel at the preliminary hearing,
the Court detailed the essential benefits accruing to a defend-
ant who has counsel at the preliminary hearing. These include
opportunities
(1) to expose through direct and cross examination the weak-
nesses in the state's case that may lead the magistrate to
refuse to bind over the accused for trial;
(2) to skillfully interrogate witnesses in a manner that might
provide a tool for impeachment of the state's witnesses
during a trial; and
(3) to more effectively discover the case the state has against
the accused and to prepare a proper defense.30
While the California Penal Code requires a preliminary ex-
amination only of charges made by information 31 and not those
made by indictment, the California Supreme Court has ex-
tended the defendant's right to have charges made against him
by indictment examined by a magistrate. The California stat-
ute itself provides that criminal filings in the superior court
may follow one of two procedures. Either the prosecution
must go to the grand jury and seek an indictment or they must
file a complaint in municipal court, present evidence at a pre-
liminary examination and, on that basis, file an information.
However, the California Supreme Court in Hawkins v. Supe-
27. CAL. PENAL CODE § 807 defines a magistrate as "an officer having power to issue
a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with a public offense." See also CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 808 which says that all judges of the state are magistrates.
28. CAL. CONsT. art. 6, § 10 assigns "original jurisdiction in all cases except those
given by statute to other trial courts" to the Superior Courts. Prosecution of a felony
can be initiated either by grand jury indictment or by an information fied with the
Superior Court by the prosecutor.
29. 399 U.S. 1, 10 (1970).
30. Id. at 9.
31. CAL. PENAL CODE § 738 (West 1970).
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rior Court32 considered the preliminary hearing to be so impor-
tant that a defendant now has the right to have a preliminary
examination even after a grand jury has returned an
indictment.
Criticizing the lack of equal protection afforded the indicted
defendant compared to the defendant prosecuted by informa-
tion, the California court held in Hawkins that an indicted de-
fendant has the right to have his indictment examined by a
neutral and detached magistrate in an adversarial hearing just
as a defendant charged by information does.3 The court noted
that
the defendant accused by information "immediately becomes
entitled to an impressive array of procedural rights, including a
preliminary hearing before a neutral and legally knowledgea-
ble magistrate, representation by retained or appointed coun-
sel, the confrontation and cross examination of hostile
witnesses, and the opportunity to personally appear and to af-
firmatively present exculpatory evidence. 3 4
It is important to note that Hawkins was decided in 1978
when a defendant still had the right to close his preliminary
examination upon request.35 While it might be argued today
that by demanding a preliminary hearing after being indicted,
a defendant is trading the closed grand jury room for the due
process benefits available in an open courtroom, that was
clearly not the intent of the California Supreme Court. Haw-
kins gave the defendant the right to challenge the grand jury's
determination of probable cause.3 6 Hawkins sought to give the
indicted defendant the same rights as the defendant charged
by information. It did not purport to narrow the defendant's
rights and protections, but rather to expand them.
Thus under California law, the preliminary hearing is not
only acknowledged to be a critical stage of the proceedings in
cases prosecuted by information, but it is proclaimed by the
state Supreme Court as a right to which all potential felony
defendants are entitled. Today, no one in California may be
prosecuted without the opportunity to have a full adversarial
screening before his case is brought to superior court.
32. 22 Cal. 3d 584 (1978).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 587 (quoting Johnson v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 248, 256 (1975)).
35. CAL. PENAL CODE § 868 was not amended until 1982.
36. 22 Cal. 3d at 593-594.
No. 21
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IV
Probable Cause: The Standard For Screening
Governmental Intrusions On The
Individual
Felonies comprise the most serious class of crimes in Cali-
fornia,3 7 and the preliminary examination is the last screening
procedure before a felony charge is filed in the superior court.
However, the filing of any criminal charge, be it a felony or a
misdemeanor, is accompanied by other screening stages which
are imposed to protect individuals against unreasonable intru-
sions by the government into their lives. At each of these
stages, the burden is on the government to justify further in-
trusion by showing that it has probable cause to proceed with
the case.38
California courts have recognized that "the definition of
probable cause ... has been consistently applied with equal
force to the issuance of warrants, to arrests without warrants,
to commitment [for trial] by a magistrate, and to indictment by
a grand jury. ' 39
A. A Lesser Standard for a Lesser Intrusion: Stop and Frisk
In Terry v. Ohio,4 ° the United States Supreme Court defined
a special category of fourth amendment intrusions. These are
so substantially less intrusive than arrest that the general rule
requiring probable cause to make an intrusion on fourth
amendment rights reasonable could, in narrow circumstances,
be subordinated to a balancing test: individual privacy right
weighed against the state interests in crime detection and po-
lice safety.4 The Court recognized that these "stop and frisk"
actions were a serious intrusion on a person and must be
tested by the fourth amendment's general proscription against
unreasonable searches and seizures.42 But the balancing test
allowed by the court was seen as sufficient to make such police
actions reasonable under the fourth amendment.
37. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 16, 17 (West 1970).
38. See infra text accompanying notes 51-56.
39. People v. Aday, 226 Cal. App. 2d 520, 532-533 (1964) (citations omitted).
40. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 17.
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The California Supreme Court, in In re Tony C. ,43 applied the
Terry rule to California law. There, the court said, "[i] t is set-
tled that circumstances short of probable cause to make an ar-
rest may justify the police officer stopping and briefly detaining
a person for questioning or other limited investigation."" The
standard permitting this investigative stop or brief detention
requires that circumstances known or apparent to the officer
include specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect
that some activity relating to crime has taken place or is hap-
pening, or is about to happen, and that the person he intends to
stop or detain is involved in such activity. Not only must the
officer subjectively entertain such a suspicion; it must be ob-
jectively reasonable for him to do so. 5
B. Probable Cause, Otherwise the Standard
The California application of the Terry rule is so limited that
even detaining a person stopped on a traffic violation, for
longer than it takes to write the citation while the officer runs a
warrant check has been disapproved.46 The California
Supreme Court recognized that just as a search, reasonable at
its inception, may violate the fourth amendment by virtue of its
intolerable scope and intensity, an investigative detention may
transgress constitutional bounds when extended beyond cir-
cumstances which make its initiation permissible." Therefore,
said the court, such a detention is forbidden, absent a showing
of probable cause.
Probable cause, reasonable cause to believe a particular indi-
vidual has committed a particular offense, is needed before the
police can detain an individual beyond the brief interruption
allowed in Terry,48 before the police can transport a suspected
individual for identification49 or for questioning,50 and before
police can make a warrantless arrest.5 ' A magistrate must
make a determination that there is probable cause before issu-
43. 21 Cal. 3d 888 (1978).
44. Id. at 892.
45. Id. at 893.
46. People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal. 3d 577 (1979).
47. Id. at 586.
48. See supra note 46.
49. People v. Harris, 15 Cal. 3d 384 (1975).
50. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
51. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West 1970).
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ing an arrest warrant,52 a search warrant 53 or an extradition
warrant. 54 A municipal court or justice court judge can be re-
quired to make a determination of probable cause in a
misdemeanor case if the defendant is in custody at the
arraignment. 55
In Dunaway v. New York, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that "[t] he 'long prevailing standards' of probable
cause embodied 'the best compromise that has been found for
accomodating the often opposing interests' in 'safeguarding cit-
izens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy'
and 'in seeking to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the
community's protection.' ,,56 Probable cause represents,
through an accumulation of precedent, the minimum standard
needed to justify government intrusion on the individual.57
V
Privacy and Governmental Intrusion
A. The Fourth Amendment58
The United States Supreme Court has described the basic
purpose of the fourth amendment as safeguarding the privacy
and security of the individual against arbitrary invasion by
government officials.59 In Katz v. United States,60 the Supreme
Court expanded the protection offered by the fourth amend-
ment to areas where one might reasonably expect privacy.6'
By overruling its earlier view that the fourth amendment pro-
tected one against trespass by the government,62 the Court ex-
panded the concept of the fourth amendment as protecting the
security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusions by the
52. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 813 (West 1970).
53. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1525 (West 1970).
54. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1551 (West 1970).
55. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1427 (West 1970).
56. 442 U.S. at 208 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
57. 442 U.S. at 208.
58. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution reads: "The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend.
Iv.
59. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
60. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
61. Id. at 353.
62. Katz announced the trespass doctrine of Olmstead was no longer controlling.
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government.63 Katz expressly left protection of the more gen-
eral right of privacy to the states" but as the Court stated in
Stanley v. Georgia ,65 a case involving the seizure of pornogra-
phy in a private home, the right to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusions on one's privacy is fundamental.6 6
B. Privacy and the California Constitution
While the United States Constitution does not explicitly
mention any right to privacy,67 the California Constitution
does. Article I, section 1 reads:
All people are by nature free and independent and have cer-
tain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and
defending life and liberty: acquiring, possessing, and protect-
ing property; and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness,
and privacy.68
Though privacy was expressly added to this section only in
1972,69 courts in California have long recognized an individual's
right to privacy.
Recognition has been given of a right of privacy, independent
of the common rights of property, contract, reputation and
physical integrity, generally described as "the right to live
one's life in seclusion, without being subjected to unwarranted
and undesired publicity. In short it is the right to be let
alone. , 70
The express grant of a right to privacy in the California Con-
stitution protects more than those areas protected by the
fourth amendment. In White v. Davis,7' the California
Supreme Court held that the constitutional amendment grant-
ing an express right to privacy created an enforceable privacy
right for all Californians. That this right is more encompassing
than the privacy protection from the fourth amendment is
made clear by the court's approval of the argument that pri-
vacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by several United
63. Id.
64. 389 U.S. at 350-351.
65. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
66. Id. at 564.
67. See supra note 64.
68. CAL. CONST. art. I.
69. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757 (1975).
70. Gill v. Curtis Publishing, 38 Cal. 2d 273, 276 (1952) quoting Melvin v. Reid, 112
Cal. App. 285, 289 (1931).
71. 13 Cal. 3d 757 (1975).
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States Constitutional amendments.72
The California court in White cited with approval the argu-
ment appearing in the state election brochure supporting voter
approval of a constitutional right to privacy.73 In his opinion
for the court, Justice Tobriner noted the brochure "represents,
in essence, the only 'legislative history' of the constitutional
amendment. '74 The arguments in the brochure emphasize that
there are not "effective restraints on the information activities
of government and business. This amendment ... creates a
legal and enforceable right of privacy for every Californian.175
At issue in White v. Davis was a police practice whereby of-
ficers posed as students to attend university classes for the
purpose of "intelligence gathering".76 Besides first amendment
obstacles to such police behavior, the court found these activi-
ties an invasion of the express constitutional right to privacy.
The brochure argument, approved by the court, concluded
"[t] he right of privacy is an important American heritage and
essential to fundamental rights guaranteed by the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendmaents to the U.S. Constitution.
This right should be abridged only when there is a compelling
public need ....
As has been shown, in the criminal law area, probable cause
to believe one has committed a crime has been recognized as
the compelling public need warranting abridgement of the in-
dividual's privacy by the government. At each stage of the
criminal prosecution procedure, probable cause must be estab-
lished to justify further abridgment of the accused's right to be
left alone.
C. Probable Cause and Individual Privacy
1. Expungement of Arrest Records
The importance of probable cause as the standard for per-
mitting intrusions on privacy can be shown where courts have
gone so far as to order the expungement of arrest records of
defendants arrested without probable cause.78 In Sullivan v.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 774.
74. Id. at 775.
75. Id. at 760.
76. Id. at 775.
77. Id.
78. CAL. PENAL CODE § 849(c) provides that where a person is subjected to a war-
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Murphy,79 the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals,
citing its "broad and flexible and equitable powers," expunged
the arrest records of antiwar demonstrators when the court
found the government had failed to meet its burden of estab-
lishing probable cause for arrest. The court found such arrests
to be in violation of the defendant's fourth amendment rights.
Agreeing with the defendant's contention that nothing else
would be an adequate remedy, the court ordered outright ex-
pungement of the arrest records.8 0
In Colorado, the state supreme court granted a plaintiff's mo-
tion to have her arrest record expunged on the ground that the
record violated her right of privacy.81 The plaintiff had been
arrested on a vagrancy charge and was subsequently acquit-
ted. In noting the lack of a legislative prescription for treat-
ment of the records of an acquitted person as well as the
court's and the legislature's expressed concern for the individ-
ual's right of privacy,8 2 the Colorado court was alarmed, as was
the California court in White v. Davis,83 by the increasing abil-
ity of the government and industry to collect and disseminate
information about the individual.8
2. Expungement of Grand Jury Records
The Colorado Court of Appeals relied on this concern ex-
pressed by the Colorado Supreme Court when it ordered the
expungement of a plaintiffs name from two indictments. 5 In
both indictments the plaintiff was repeatedly referred to as an
rantless arrest on less than probable cause and is subsequently released, that arrest is
to be recorded as a "detention."
79. 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
80. 478 F.2d 971; see also Dean v. Gladner, 451 F. Supp. 1313 (S.D. Texas 1978);
Washington Mobilization Committee v. Cullinane, 400 F. Sup. 186 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Ur-
ban v. Breier, 401 F. Supp. 706 (E.D. Wis. 1975); but cf Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal.
3d 859 (1976) where the California Supreme Court refused to expunge an arrest record.
Charges against the defendant had been dismissed for failure to prosecute. Citing the
limited but compelling uses of such records by authorities, the court held that the de-
fendant's privacy rights under article 1, section 1 of the California Constitution did not
prohibit their retention. The court did not discuss the defendant's rights to privacy
under the fourth amendment and article 1, section 13; the defendants appear not to
have argued that they were arrested without probable cause.
81. Davidson v. Dill, 503 P.2d 157 (Colo. 1972).
82. Id. at 160.
83. 13 Cal. 3d 757 (1975).
84. 503 P.2d at 158-159.
85. Berman v. People, 589 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1978), cert. den., Jan. 22, 1979.
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"unindicted co-conspirator. ' 86 The charges in the indictments
were disposed of when the indicted individuals pleaded to
lesser charges and the indictments were dismissed. The court
held that the harm to the plaintiff's privacy outweighed the
public interest in retaining the records of his being named an
unindicted co-conspirator.
7
3. Privacy as a Bar to Arrest Record Dissemination
The District of Columbia Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals
has expressed concern for the individual's rights to privacy
and due process where arrest record dissemination is con-
cerned. In Utz v. Cullinane 88 the court granted declaratory re-
lief to four petitioners seeking to prevent the District of
Columbia police from forwarding their arrest records to an FBI
file. The court noted the petitioners did not seek expungement
nor challenge the existence of probable cause for their ar-
rests.89 Neither did the petitioners assert that police mainte-
nance of such records violated their due process rights.90
Although the court recognized the value of the arrest records
for law enforcement purposes, it nevertheless questioned the
constitutional validity of disseminating such records, espe-
cially where no conviction had resulted. The court expressed
doubt about the constitutionality of a federal statute which
funneled preconviction and post-exoneration records from the
D.C. police to the FBI but stopped short of declaring the stat-
ute unconstitutional.9' Yet the court forthrightly asserted that:
[d] ue process obligates the government to accord an individual
the opportunity to disprove potentially damaging allegations
before it disseminates information that might be used to his
detriment. The proper forum for definitely adjudicating an in-
dividual's guilt or innocence is a trial that conforms to constitu-
tional strictures; if the government aborts that procedure or if
the individual is otherwise vindicated at trial, the Constitution
requires that he be treated as though he engaged in no crimi-
nal activity. For the government to disseminate an arrest rec-
ord pertaining to the alledgedly criminal episode, when it
knows that employers may infer that the individual was guilty
86. Id. at 509.
87. Id.
88. 520 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
89. Id. at 474-475.
90. Id. at 475.
91. Id. at 477.
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rather than innocent of the crime, effectively permits the gov-
ernment to inflict punishment despite the fact that guilt was
not constitutionally established.92
The court then granted the summary relief in which the
plaintiffs sought to assert their constitutional interests in pri-
vacy and due process.93
In Doe v. Webster,94 the D.C. Circuit again expressed concern
for the petitioner's right to privacy when a youthful ex-offender
sought to have records of a federal conviction expunged.95 The
court discussed two reasons given by the government for main-
taining such records: the need to preserve an accurate record
in order not to "rewrite history" and the need for a record for
investigative and other law enforcement purposes.96 The court
discounted the first reason,97 pointing to expungement of in-
dictments and special grand jury reports that were defamatory,
and of records of an assortment of enforcement, administrative
and prosecutorial organizations for a variety of reasons, with-
out loss to history and noted that "[T] he list could be extended
almost indefinitely."98 Although the court gave weight to inves-
tigative and enforcement needs, it reiterated its concern for the
right to privacy which it had expressed in Utz v. Cullinane."
4. The California View
The California Court of Appeal has held that dissemination
by the state to public employers of records of an applicant's
arrest not ending in conviction, violated the individual's right
to privacy under article 1, section 1 of the California Constitu-
tion.100 Probable cause for arrest was not in contention but the
court found no compelling interest served by disseminating
these records. In Central Valley Chapter, Seventh Step Foun-
dation v. Younger, 10 the Court of Appeal discussed the 1972
constitutional amendment:
The adoption of the amendment was intended to strengthen
92. Id. at 480-481.
93. Id. at 491.
94. 606 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
95. Id. at 1238.
96. Id. at 1241.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1243.
99. Id. at 1238 n.49.
100. 95 Cal. App. 3d 212 (1979).
101. Id.
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the right of privacy. The elevation of the right to be free from
invasions of privacy to constitutional stature was apparently
intended to be an expansion of the privacy right. The election
brochure argument states: "The right to privacy is much more
than 'unnecessary wordage.' It is fundamental to any free soci-
ety. Privacy is not now guaranteed by our State Constitution.
This simple amendment will extend various court decisions on
privacy to insure protection of our basic rights.' °2
The appellate court acknowledged that the right to privacy is
not absolute. °3 However, incursion into an individual's pri-
vacy must be justified by a compelling interest. The state ar-
gued that the administrative difficulty of separating arrests not
ending in conviction from actual convictions when furnishing a
record to an entitled organization gave the state that compel-
ling interest. The court rejected this argument. °4 While the
state may have a compelling interest in maintaining such
records,105 that alone is not enough to justify dissemination of
that information to employers.
The court in Central Valley found that five different employ-
ees of the Oakland Civil Service Commission had misread the
petitioner's records, interpreting arrests as convictions and
had consequently denied the petitioner employment. 10 6 The
California court quoted Utz v. Cullinane in supporting its con-
tention that "'employers cannot or will not distinguish be-
tween arrests resulting in conviction and arrests which do
not.' 11107
To an accused, the possibility of damage from the public's
misapprehension of information made public in a preliminary
hearing seems as great as the possibility of damage from mis-
interpreting arrest records.
The election brochure argument, cited with approval in
White, implies that the express right to privacy under article 1,
section 1 of the California Constitution is an attempt to consoli-
date the protection of the federal Bill of Rights' 08 into a sub-
stantive source of the right to privacy. The California Supreme
Court has made it clear that governmental intrusion on this
102. Id. at 235 (quoting Porten v. USF, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 829 (1976)).
103. 95 Cal. App. 3d at 237 (citing Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d 859 (1976)).
104. 95 Cal. App. 3d at 238.
105. Id. at 235.
106. Id. at 230-231.
107. Id. at 231.
108. See supra note 77.
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right is tolerated only where there is a compelling state inter-
est served by such an intrusion.10 9 Where probable cause for
arrest is not disputed and the compelling state interest in keep-
ing arrest records was established, the individual's right to pri-
vacy was subordinated to this state interest in keeping the
records. 110 Where probable cause for arrest is unchallenged,
and there are no compelling state interests served by dissemi-
nating the arrest record and no conviction has resulted, the
privacy right of the accused, under the California Constitution,
bars dissemination.'
VI
Privacy and The Preliminary Hearing
A. Rights of the Press and the Public to Attend a Preliminary
Hearing
In San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court,"2 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of the
pre-amended section 868, dealt with the question of whether
the press and the public have a right to attend a preliminary
examination. The court found that neither the public nor the
press has an unqualified right to attend a preliminary examina-
tion under either the U.S. or the California Constitution. 1 3
The court first looked at the question of access to information
under the first amendment noting that "'[t]he right to speak
and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to
gather information.' ""4 Further, the court could find no right
of media access to places where the public presence is prop-
erly restricted. Among these places, said the court, are grand
jury proceedings, executive sessions of official bodies, meet-
ings of private organizations and the conferences of high
courts themselves." 5 The court noted that a majority of five
U.S. Supreme Court Justices in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale"6
found no public or media right to attend suppression of evi-
109. Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d 859 (1976).
110. That state interest is "promotion of more efficient law enforcement and crimi-
nal justice." 17 Cal. 3d at 864.
111. See supra note 100.
112. 30 Cal. 3d 498 (1982).
113. Id. at 506.
114. Id. at 502 (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965)).
115. Id. at 502 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 66 (1972)).
116. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
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dence hearings. 7 Three of these justices 118 agreed that the
preliminary hearing was traditionally subject to closure. Four
justices dissenting in Gannett"9 argued that the suppression
hearing is critically important because it might provide the
public its only opportunity to learn of police misconduct where
evidence has been suppressed and a trial precluded. But the
dissenters considered the preliminary hearing to be less criti-
cal to criminal justice proceedings than the suppression hear-
ing and not closely equivalent to a trial, which is traditionally
open.1 0 This is important to note because these dissenters
agreed with Chief Justice Burger in Nebraska v. Press Associa-
tion v. Stuart that pretrial proceedings are presumably open.
The pretrial stage then, is that period after a preliminary hear-
ing and before the opening of the trial. The California court
noted that a total of seven justices agreed that th6 preliminary
hearing was traditionally subject to closure.121 These same
seven justices, said the California court, stressed the common
law tradition of open trials in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia.22 Thus, the California Supreme Court declined to
hold that a right of access to a preliminary hearing arose under
the federal constitution.
The California court then turned to the state constitution. It
noted that section 868 predated the public trial guarantee of
the state constitution by some seven years. 23 Since the consti-
tutional convention which approved the public trial guarantee
saw no inconsistency between an open trial and a closed hear-
ing, the court found that the trial provision did not confer a
right to attend the preliminary examination on the press and
the public. 24 Similarly, when the California liberty-of-speech
clause was reincorporated at the 1879 constitutional conven-
tion, no inconsistency with section 868 was noted. The
supreme court, in San Jose Mercury-News, declined to find
one. 125
The court concluded that the statute, giving the defendant
117. 30 Cal. 3d at 503.
118. Id. at 503-504.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 504-505.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 506.
123. Id. at 507.
124. Id. at 508.
125. Id.
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control over access, was a proper means of protecting the de-
fendant's right to a criminal trial free of juror bias that might
result from a public preliminary hearing.'26
B. The Old Law
Until amended in 1982, California Penal Code section 868
codified the right to a closed, private examination of felony
charges if the defendant so requested. 2 ' Absent a magistrate's
determination of probable cause for a trial, the government
could not force a defendant into a public forum. The probable
cause standard for screening governmental intrusions is
founded on a fundamental right to privacy as articulated by
courts over the last few decades. The old section 868 was truer
to this principle than its replacement.
Enacted in 1872, section 868 was based on the Field Code. 1 28
Some commentators have attributed this section to nothing
more than Field's known antipathy toward the press.1 29 How-
ever, Field's anticipation of the right to privacy has been sug-
gested as at least as convincing a rationale for the content of
this penal code section as it was written. 30 Notwithstanding
legislative history, or the lack thereof,'13 it follows from the
analysis of probable cause and privacy presented above that
126. Id. at 514.
127. Prior to the 1982 amendment, section 868 read:
The magistrate must also, upon the request of the defendant, exclude from the
examination every person except his clerk, court reporter and bailiff, the pros-
ecutor and his counsel, the Attorney General, the district attorney of the
county, the investigating officer, the officer having custody of a prisoner wit-
ness while the prisoner is testifying, the defendant and his counsel, and the
officer having the defendant in custody; provided, however, that ... a prose-
cuting witness may, in the discretion of the court, be entitled for moral support
to the attendance of one person of his or her own choosing otherwise not a
witness. The person so chosen shall not discuss prior to or during the prelimi-
nary hearing the testimony of the prosecuting witness with any person, other
than the prosecuting witness, who is a witness in the examination. Nothing in
this section shall affect the right to exclude witnesses as provided in Section
867 of the Penal Code.
128. The Field Code was written by David Dudley Field and was first implemented
in the State of New York in 1849. See M. GREEN, BASIC CrIL PROCEDURE 93-94 (1972).
129. Borow & Kruth, Closed Preliminary Hearings: The Constitutionality of Penal
Code Section 868 in the Aftermath of Gannett v. DePasquale, 55 CAI. ST. B. J. 18, 19
(1980).
130. Geis, Preliminary Hearings and the Press, 8 UCLA L REv. 397, 409 (1961).
131. There is little history available. See Note, Access to Preliminary Hearings: Is
California's Closure Law Unconstitutional? 3 COMM/ENT L.J. 245 (1981).
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the preliminary hearing should be closed to the public at the
defendant's request.
The preliminary hearing is designed, where the charge
against the defendant is not substantiated, to spare the ac-
cused the expense and degradation of a criminal trial.132 The
California Supreme Court has recognized the importance to
the accused of a closed proceeding:
Section 868 provided a substantial and often indispensible pro-
tection to the person who is unjustifiably accused of a criminal
offense. The legislature has specifically conferred upon the ac-
cused the right to protect his name from being maligned at a
preliminary examination.' 33
The preliminary examination is not a trial although there are
many similarities to a trial: "Witnesses may be cross-ex-
amined, credibility is crucial, and each side has an incentive to
prevail."'134 Discovery is allowed before a preliminary hear-
ing, 35 and a defendant may raise an affirmative defense 36 or
he may remain silent. 31
Under the old law, the preliminary examination had to be
closed whenever the defendant so moved.3 8 Closure was not
132. See Wilson v. Harris, 351 F.2d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. den., 383 U.S. 951
(1966).
133. San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498 (1982).
134. 30 Cal. 3d at 510.
135. Holman v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 480 (1981).
136. People v. Orduno, 80 Cal. App. 3d 738 (1978).
137. 30 Cal. 3d at 512.
138. In People v. Elliot, 54 Cal. 2d 498 (1960), the California Supreme Court over-
turned the conviction of a defendant who had requested and was denied a closed hear-
ing. ' The right afforded to the defendant by Section 868 of the Penal Code to require
that all unauthorized persons be excluded from the courtroom during the preliminary
examination, is a substantial safeguard which cannot be disregarded by the magis-
trate. The section is mandatory." The court further held "the legislature has specifi-
cally conferred upon an accused the right to protect his name from being maligned at a
preliminary examination."
In People v. Pompa-Ortiz, 27 Cal. 3d 519 (1980), the court reiterated its holding: "[i]t
is settled that denial of a substantial right at the preliminary examination renders the
ensuing commitment illegal and entitles a defendant to dismissal of the information on
timely motion." Pompa-Ortiz differed from Elliot in that it was not the defendant but
rather the victim in a rape case who requested a closed preliminary examination while
she testified. The court held that the legislature had intended to grant defendants a
public hearing except as provided under Section 868 and therefore the magistrate had
erred in closing the examination on other than the defendant's request. However, the
Elliot holding was restricted to the extent that where an error under Section 868 was
not challenged in a timely manner, a showing of prejudice on account of the error was
required for dismissal of charges. The only exception to the requirement of showing
prejudice in untimely appeals is where an examination contains a jurisdictional error.
The court left intact the defendant's right to a pretrial challenge of irregularities in
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within the magistrate's discretion; he could neither close the
hearing without the defendant's consent 139 nor open it against
the defendant's will.
140
C. The New Law
It should be again emphasized that this note argues for a cat-
egorical right to close a preliminary examination on the
grounds of the privacy of the accused. The United States
Supreme Court,1 4 1 the California Supreme Court' 42 and the
California Legislature 43 have all acknowledged that due pro-
cess rights to a fair trial may also require the closing of a pre-
liminary examination. Due process rights to a fair trial may be
weighed against the first amendment rights to public access in
any pretrial proceeding, resulting in a case-by-case or ad hoc
balancing. Now, in accord with the amended section 868, only
the proven possibility of prejudice at trial justifies the closure
of the preliminary examination to the press and public. But
the quickness with which the preliminary hearing may occur
after arrest can prevent a defendant from showing that
prejudice.'" Although a defendant can move to suppress evi-
dence before a preliminary hearing,145 he need not do so. He
may choose to make such a motion at the pretrial stage after
the preliminary hearing.' 46 Therefore, it is possible that evi-
dence may be presented at a preliminary hearing that might
later be suppressed. Yet the California Court of Appeal has
ruled that the public's right of access to information regarding
an ongoing criminal procedure does not include the right to
pretrial disclosure of inadmissable evidence. 47
Lawmakers'4 and commentators 49 have advocated the use
the preliminary examination without any showing of prejudice. Denial of the right to a
closed preliminary examination remains grounds for defeating a commitment for trial
in superior court.
139. People v. Pompa-Ortiz, 27 Cal. 3d 519 (1980).
140. People v. Elliot, 54 Cal. 2d 498 (1960).
141. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
142. See San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498 (1982).
143. See supra CAL. PENAL CODE § 868 as amended, note 1.
144. See San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498, 513 (1982).
145. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(f). See also San Jose Mercury-News v. Munici-
pal Court, 30 Cal. 3d at 510.
146. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(h).
147. Allegrezza v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 948 (1975).
148. See supra note 1.
149. See supra note 129.
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of the balancing test for preliminary hearing closure that was
advanced by Justice Stewart in Gannett v. DePasquale,150
where closure of pretrial suppression hearings was at issue.
The California Supreme Court has pointed out the weakness of
using such a test to close a preliminary hearing in San Jose
Mercury-News, saying that the quickness with which a prelimi-
nary examination is held may preclude a showing of prejudice
to the defendant's fair trial right.151 Whether. .... in any
given case actual prejudice can be proven if the case goes to
trial, the accused's privacy rights still demand a closed prelimi-
nary hearing.
In fact, it is the case that does not go to trial that makes the
point. The accused has a right to a final screening to determine
if there is probable cause to send him to the superior court.
Because the accused is presumed innocent, a magistrate has
no valid means of predicting the outcome of the hearing. The
magistrate must presume that the defendant will not be held
to answer to an information and that probable cause will not be
found. The magistrate must maintain this presumption until
he hears all the evidence. Therefore the magistrate must pre-
sume from the outset that the government has already improp-
erly intruded into the defendant's life by the arrest and filing of
the complaint. To avoid compounding the intrusion, the magis-
trate should keep the proceeding closed to the public until
probable cause for the government's actions has been found.
It is one thing for a judge to determine if an open pretrial
hearing might endanger a defendant's right to a fair trial. At
the time of such a hearing in superior court, probable cause for
a trial has been established and it is apparent, if not certain,
that a trial will occur. Gannett leaves it to the court's discre-
tion to balance the danger of prejudicial publicity against the
dangers of denying public access. 15 2
It is quite another thing, however, to require a magistrate to
make such a finding before it is decided there will be a trial.
The new law requires the defendant to request closure be-
cause he presumes he will be bound over for a trial and what
comes out at the preliminary hearing will prejudice his chance
for a fair trial. The magistrate must close the preliminary hear-
ing if he, at the outset, finds there will be a trial and what will
150. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
151. 30 Cal. 3d at 513.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 100-110.
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be revealed at the preliminary hearing is going to make it diffi-
cult to have a fair trial. The whole purpose of the preliminary
hearing is to require the prosecution to prove to a neutral and
detached magistrate that there is probable cause for a trial.
Yet under the new law one of the magistrate's first acts might
require him to prejudge the case and act on the assumption
that there will be a trial. Surely such a presumption conflicts
with a principle that is fundamental to our system of justice:
the presumption of innocence.
VII
Conclusion
Prior to being amended, Penal Code section 868 allowed one
accused of a felony to protect his privacy until the prosecution
had established, before a magistrate, the existence of probable
cause to try the defendant.
Absent probable cause to believe an accused has committed
a particular crime, the state has no grounds for compelling a
defendant to defend himself in a public forum against his will.
It is important to distinguish the state's interest in establishing
probable cause for a trial from its interest in forcing the ac-
cused to surrender his right of privacy to the public before
probable cause for a trial is established. The need for criminal
justice and law enforcement has been held sufficient to war-
rant the state's gathering and retaining information about pos-
sible criminal activity by a particular person.15 3 However, the
need to make that information available to the public is a sepa-
rable and less compelling need than that of law enforcement.'54
Courts have recognized that the right of privacy is a protec-
tion against dissemination of criminal process records that
might be misinterpreted by the public.15 5 The California
Supreme Court has recognized that the public might misap-
prehend the significance of the preliminary hearing or confuse
the hearing with a trial on the issue of guilt or innocence. 56
This is especially threatening to the defendant who for
whatever reason does not present a defense at the preliminary
hearing. The specter of onesided publicity might induce the
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498 (1982).
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accused to abandon his right to silence in favor of "trying the
case in the media. 15 7
Both the California Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court have recognized limits on the constitutional
rights of access that the public and the press have to the court-
room. Among these limits is a restriction on access to the pre-
liminary examination.
The right to privacy can only be breached by the state if
there is a compelling state need. In the context of the Penal
Code, that need ought to be probable cause, whether it be to
arrest, search, indict, or bind over for a trial. Where probable
cause has not been established before a neutral and detached
magistrate, forcing the accused to appear in a public forum un-
constitutionally abridges his right to privacy.
In the past, section 868 provided a statutory method for one
accused of a crime in California to assert this fundamental,
constitutional right. As amended, section 868 takes no cogni-
zance of this right. The revised section merely frames the is-
sue of the closed preliminary hearing as one of due process:
the right to a fair trial. Clearly, one's right to privacy in Califor-
nia is not adequately protected by such a view. Absent legisla-
tion to repeal the recent amendment, it seems clear that
California courts should find the change constitutionally
objectionable.
157. Id.
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